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OBSTACLES TO FEDERAL JURISDICTION: NEW
BARRIERS TO NON -SEGREGATED PUBLIC
EDUCATION IN OLD FORMS
Two years ago the Supreme Court ruled that separate educational facili-
ties according to race are inherently unequal, and that such segregation is
a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment." The result of this decision was to render legally in-
operative 2 the long-existent public school segregation laws of twenty-five
jurisdictions.3 Since then, a flurry of legislation designed to avoid the
effect of that decision has been enacted in many of these states. Some of
this legislation empowers state or local governments to abolish state-
supported public schools.4 Other enactments facilitate gerrymandering of
school districts0 Much is old law enacted in bold contempt of its un-
constitutionality.0
This Note is primarily concerned with a different category of legisla-
tion, seemingly constitutionally valid on its face. Typical is a statute
authorizing local school boards to assign individual children to particular
schools.7 In making these assignments, the boards are to adopt such
rules and regulations as they may see fit 8 in order to provide for ". . . the
orderly and efficient administration of such public schools, the effective in-
struction of the pupils therein enrolled, and the health, safety and general
welfare of such pupils." 9 The enrollment criteria that a particular school
district may establish, within its legitimate exercise of the police power,
are not enumerable. Educational aptitude, intelligence quotient, cleanli-
ness, health, emotional stability and morals are a few of the more obvious.' 0
However, effective maintenance of a segregated school system will un-
doubtedly require genuine racial discrimination in addition to this multi-
tude of more rational standards. Within the state's own administrative
1. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 387-90 (1880).
3. KoNviTz, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 230 (1946) (statutes col-
lected). These compiled statutes were all in force in 1955 with some minor changes
in various code locations.
4. See GA. CoNsT. art. VIII, §13, cl. 1 (1955); S.C. CODE §21-230(7) (Supp.
1955).
5. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 32-954 (Supp. 1955); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 165.170,
165.294, 165.677, 165.680, 165.685 (Supp. 1955).
6. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.23(4) (a) (Supp. 1955); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 32-2101b,
32-2102b (Supp. 1955); OYLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 5(3), 5(8), 5(11) (Supp.
1955).
7. See, e.g, Acts of Ala. 1955, No. 201, § 4, at 493; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 23023
(6) (g) (Supp. 1955); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:81.1 (Supp. 1955); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 6334-01 to -05 (Supp. 1954).
8. E.g., Acts of Ala. 1955, No. 201, § 4, at 493.
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 230.23(6) (g) (2) (Supp. 1955).
10. See Acts of Ala. 1955, No. 201, § 4, at 493.
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and judicial system, this unconstitutional discrimination might go unre-
dressed by the more sympathetic and popularly-elected officials.'
To avoid federal interference, these statutes provide for review in the
state courts, and in some instances, appeal to the courts is permitted only
after review by a higher administrative body. 2 , If such provisions pre-
vent attack in the federal district courts, integration might be delayed in-
definitely. In addition to the time and money involved in exhausting
state remedies, Supreme Court review of the action of state courts is pos-
sible only by means of certiorari, 13 which may be ineffective to protect
federal rights. The Court will be limited to the state court's record and
may be unable to go behind the state's findings of fact to detect actual
discrimination. 14  Moreover, the state's decision is likely to be super-
ficially supportable on adequate state grounds.15 Finally, in many cases
the controversy would be moot by the time all state procedures were ex-
hausted. For these reasons, the ultimate success of these statutes in de-
laying compliance with the segregation decrees depends largely on whether
such provisions for state court review raise effective barriers to federal
district court jurisdiction to enforce the desegregation decree.' 6
Under varying limitations to be considered on the assertion of federal
jurisdiction, these statutes would present to the federal courts four choices
of the stage at which federal proceedings may be initiated. It might be
decided that, in order to give immediate effect to the Supreme Court de-
cree, claimants should be permitted to enter a federal district court without
first appealing to the appropriate administrative board or boards. Sec-
ondly, federal courts might require exhaustion of state administrative
procedure but offer the claimant a choice of state or federal judicial re-
view on completion of such appeals. However, should the Court decide
that rapid implementation of its decision is uniise or that state courts
11. Federal courts may be more likely to protect federal rights adequately. See
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L. Rxv. 157,
158, 172-76 (1953).
12. See, e.g., Acts of Ala. 1955, No. 201, § 4, at 494; LA. REv. STAT. ANw.
§ 17:81.1 (Supp. 1955).
13. Certiorari is clearly applicable since the claimant is asserting an immunity
from discrimination under the Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1952). Conceiv-
ably the case may be appealable since the claimant's contention can be described as
challenging the validity of a "statute of any state." Id. § 1257(2). In such a case an
appeal may lie. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
This principle includes all administrative orders "legislative" in character. Railway Ex-
press Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (traffic regulation promulgated by
police commissioner); Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U.S.
245 (1934). Whether it would apply to discriminatory application of these regulations
is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the difference is important since the
Supreme Court may be more disposed to deny certiorari than to dismiss an appeal
for want of a substantial federal question. See Note, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 472, 480-81
(1936). For purposes of this Note it will be assumed that an appeal would not be
available.
14. See Mishkin, supra note 11, at 173-74.
15. Of course this will not prohibit Supreme Court review if the state grounds
are without fair or substantial support. See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17
(1920); Union Pacific MR. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
16. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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may largely be depended upon to protect federal rights, a third alterna-
tive is available in requiring claimants to appeal through the state court
system before the federal district court hears the case. Any questions as
to applicable state law, or as to whether the state action would ultimately
deprive the claimant of any federal rights, would be resolved by a state
tribunal. The federal district court could then review the case to insure
that the state court's procedure had not distorted the facts so as to deprive
the claimant of his federal right. The fourth possibility is to block access
to the federal district court entirely. The only federal protection would
be review of the decision of the highest court by certiorari to the Supreme
Court.17
All of these courses may not be equally available, however. While the
power of the Supreme Court to pass final judgment on constitutional issues
is always present, the exercise of federal district court jurisdiction is
subject to certain qualifications.
When a complainant contends that he has been denied access to a state
public school solely on the basis of race, he has stated a federal claim giving
the federal courts jurisdiction under either the "federal question" 1s or
the "civil rights" -1 provision of the Judicial Code. Limitations on the
exercise of this jurisdiction demand that the federal court withhold equi-
table relief against state officials until some or all of available state pro-
cesses are followed, or may preclude a lower federal court from hearing
the case at all. These limitations will be examined so as to delineate the
restrictions surrounding federal review and provide a basis for considera-
tion of the factors which may be influential in determining what courses will
be adopted in cases arising under these statutes.
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
There is little doubt that the federal district courts will refuse to hear
cases that have not progressed entirely through proceedings before the ad-
ministrative bodies set up by the state to implement the program. The
17. See note 13 supra.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1952), Westminster School Dist v. Mendez, 161 F.2d
774 (9th Cir. 1947). Jurisdiction under this provision raises some problems. Any
child's right to a state supported education is a right created by the state, but equal
protection of the laws would seem to be ". . . rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution." REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952);
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1952). However, the Supreme Court is yet to hold directly
that this includes all rights established under the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection or due process clauses. This could be done in the school cases by reading
"rights" in § 1983 in conjunction with the declaratory REv. STAT. § 1977 (1875), 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1952), which provides in part: "All persons . . . shall have the
same right in every State . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. .... "
Education has been held to be a vested property right Wilson v. Board of Super-
visors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 340 U.S. 909 (1951). For
the stormy history and problems arising under the Civil Rights Act, see KONVITZ,
THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1946), particularly at 29-73, 97-103.
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basis of this refusal may be a statutory limitation on the district court's
jurisdiction or a judicially-imposed requirement of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies.
Restriction by Statute
A plaintiff asserting jurisdiction of a federal district court to review ac-
tions of a state body is met at the outset by the "anti-stay" provision of
the Judicial Code. Section 2283 severely restricts the power of federal
courts to stay proceedings in a state court. 20 Once proceedings are begun
in a state court, the federal judiciary will be barred from giving equitable
relief until the state proceeding has been terminated.21 A bill to enjoin
a party to the state action, rather than the state court itself, also falls
within the prohibition of the code.
The crucial question is whether the state administrative body is deemed
a court within the meaning of the code. The leading case, of the few in
which the issue has been presented, 23 is Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
R.24 Suit was brought to enjoin enforcement of a rate order of the Virginia
corporation comnission. To the objection that the commission was a
court within the meaning of the anti-stay provision, the Supreme Court
answered that rate-fixing proceedings are "legislative" in nature; that
regardless of what may be the general or dominant character of the body
in which they may take place, proceedings which are legislative in nature
are not proceedings in a court for purposes of the anti-stay legislation.2
However, the Court went on to hold that, as a matter of discretion, the
injunction should not be granted until the claimant exhausted his appeals
to the highest court of the state, since these appeals also were legislative
in nature. In most cases where administrative action has been completed,
20. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1952). The statute was originally enacted in 1874 as Rxv. STAT. § 720 (1875). It
was reenacted in 1911, 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §379 (1940), and in 1948
the statute was amended with its present exceptions. For an analysis of the excep-
tions prevailing prior to the amendment of the statute in 1948, see Comment, 35
CAI.IF. L. Rxv. 545 (1947).
21. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935). The term "proceeding" includes
all steps which may be taken in the state court from the institution to the close of the
final process. Ibid.
22. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1939);
Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935).
23. However, some commentators have stated that the provision is not applicable
to administrative bodies. See, e.g., MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES
JuDicA.L CODE 408 (1949) ; Comment, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 545 (1947).
24. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
25. "Proceedings legislative in nature are not proceedings . . . within the mean-
ing of . . . [the anti-stay statute] no matter what may be the general or dominant
character of the body in which they may take place. . . . That question depends not
upon the character of the body but upon the character of the proceedings." Id. at 226.
It does not appear that Justice Holmes was referring to legislative proceedings already
initiated in "orthodox" state courts. Since the Prentis case which required all such
proceedings to be initiated as well as to be terminated, the question is moot.
19561
978 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
federal jurisdiction has been granted or denied on the basis of such volun-
tary judicial abstention depending upon the characterization of the state
court proceedings as judicial or legislative,2 6 without discussion of whether
the administrative body is or is not a court within the meaning of the anti-
stay provision.2 7 It might be said that assertion of federal jurisdiction in
such cases is necessarily premised on an implicit finding that the admini-
strative bodies concerned are not "courts." Several decisions have indicated
that an administrative body is not a "court" if its orders are not self-
executing but can be enforced only by the judiciary.2 8  Only one case has
been found holding that a state commission was a "court." 2 9 That in-
volved an industrial accident commission whose determination of liability
for past acts closely resembles a court's adjudiciation of negligence claims.
At least one of the proposals for regulating school assignments has
attempted to exploit the federal anti-stay provision by authorizing the
legislature to declare members of school boards to be "judicial officers" and
action of school boards "judicial action." 30 It is doubtful if this alone will
be sufficient to oust federal jurisdiction.31' Whether the proceedings be
judicial in nature would seem to be a federal question based on the powers
and attributes of the body under the state statute.32 Although the Prentis
case stressed the character of the proceedings rather than the character of
the bodya both are appropriate. In many instances it may be impossible
to distinguish them. The procedure followed is relevant to both considera-
tions: Was there a record made? Were orthodox rules of evidence used?
Was the proceeding adversary in nature with full right of cross-examina-
tion? Was the trier of fact separate and distinct from the advocates? Is
26. E.g., Porter v. Investor's Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (1932) ; Bacon v. Rutland
R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914).
27. Bacon v. Rutland R.R., ,supra note 26.
28. Mississippi R.R. Comm'n v. Illinois Central R.R., 203 U.S. 335 (1906); Louis-
ville R.R. v. Brown, 123 Fed. 946 (5th Cir. 1903).
29. North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 23 F.2d 109 (D. Cal.
1918).
30. Proposed amendment to ALA. CONST. art. 6, § 139. The proposal was passed
by the Senate, January 17, 1956 and the House of Representatives on February 7,
1956. It is to be submitted to the electorate before or on the general election in
November. Letter from Alabama Legislative Reference Service to the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Feb. 17, 1956, on file in Biddle Law Library.
31. In the Prentis case, Justice Holmes stated, "If a state constitution should
provide for a hearing before any law should be passed, and should declare that it
should be a judicial proceeding in rem and -the decision binding on all the world, it
hardly is to be supposed that the simple device could make the constitutionality of the
law res judicata, if it subsequently should be drawn in question before a court of the
United States." 211 U.S. at 227.
32. The problem is one of interpreting a federal statute. In Prentis, federal cases
were cited in support of the Court's analysis of the provision, although it was noted
that state law also held the proceedings to be legislative. Id. at 226-28. In at least
one instance, the state's characterization of the proceeding has been accepted as propfer.
Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1916).
33. In Prentis, it was "assume[d] without deciding, that" where the Virginia
corporation commission was enforcing rate orders it was then a court within the
meaning of the statute. 211 U.S. at 226.
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the decision res judicata? Is- the judgment self-executing or must the
administrative body appeal to the judiciary for enforcement?
It would appear that the school authorities responsible for assigning
pupils will not be deemed tantamount to a court, nor will the proceedings
be considered judicial in nature. Therefore, the anti-stay statute will
probably not preclude federal district courts from interrupting the school
administrators. This conclusion, however, is rendered academic by an
overriding principle of voluntary judicial abstention until administrative
processes are exhausted.
The Rule of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
One of the best known rules of administrative law is that administra-
tive remedies must be exhausted before judicial relief can be obtained. Al-
though important to the promotionof efficient administration of the law,
the rule is perhaps more significant as a means of maintaining balance in
federal-state relations. Regard for state independence within the federal
system has resulted in almost unqualified application of the exhaustion rule
to efforts to secure federal injunctions against state administrative action.
A suit in the federal court before all administrative remedies have been
pursued is premature. 4
Even if the claimant applies to the administrative body charged with
initial decision, he must also appeal to any higher administrative boards to
which such appeal is authorized, if they are part of the state's administra-
tive-legislative process.3 5 The establishment of a hierarchy of state appel-
late administrative bodies has been a relatively recent development.
Although this may result in a protracted series of administrative appeals,
attempts to abbreviate the procedure have been unsuccessful.3 6
34. Davis v. Am, 199 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1952); Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123
(5th Cir. 1951),, Cook v. Davis, 178 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
811 (1950). In Davis v. Am, supra, for example, claimants alleged that they had
been excluded from a state civil service examination solely on the basis of race. The
suit in the district court was dismissed since the claimants had not applied for relief
to the personnel board, which had the power and duty under state law to rectify
the discriminatory action. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has already
indicated that Negroes seeking entrance to schools must exhaust their remedies before
the administrative board established by the North Carolina statute. Hood v. Board
of Trustees, 232 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1956), petition} for cert. filed, 25 U.S.L. WEEK
3052 (U.S. July 12, 1956) (No. 248); see Carson v. Board of Education, 227 F.2d
789, 790 (4th Cir. 1955).
35. Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Cook v. Davis, 178 F.2d 595 (5th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950). The rationale of these cases is essen-
tially an extension of the doctrine of exhaustion of legislative appeals. See text at
980-82 infra. In Peay v. Cox, supra, a dubious comparison was made of the election
-commissioner's power to that of the "legislative" court in Federal Radio Comm'n v.
General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).
36. See note 34 supra. Some of the early cases involving attempts to attack
tax assessments by suit in the district court were dismissed as collateral attacks. The
claimant's only remedy was held to be in the administrative board. First Nat'l Bank
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 U.S. 450 (1924) ; Stanley v. Board of Supervisors,
121 U.S. 535 (1887). In the latter case, the tax assessment was held to be a judicial
determination which could not be collaterally attacked.
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Certain exceptions to the exhaustion rule may enable the claimant to
avoid the administrative process entirely. When the claimant presents a
prima fade claim that the statute is invalid on its face, the federal court
may enjoin its operation, at least if the statute is part of a legislative
scheme to effect discrimination.m  Also, it would seem that if the claimant
will suffer irreparable injury from the board's order and an administrative
appellate body is unable3 8 or refuses 3 9 to enjoin the order pending appeal,
suit in the federal court for an injunction would be successful.
JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AFTER TEE STATE ADmINIsTRATIVE
BODIES HAVE ACTED BUT BEFORE REVIEW BY STATE COURTS
After the school board has rendered a decision and that decision has
been taken to the highest administrative tribunal in the educational hier-
archy, the problem of whether a federal district court will assert jurisdiction
to review that action must be considered in light of the alternative. Absten-
tion by the federal judge will be governed by a decision as to whether the
case is more properly taken to the state judicial system before, or perhaps
instead of, the federal courts.
Cases of federal abstention in favor of state courts can be divided into
two groups: first, those in which the federal courts abstain because the
judicial process in the state courts is deemed an integral part of the action
commenced in an administrative agency; second, those in which there is an
uncertain question of state law underlying the alleged federal claim so
that resolution of the state question might obviate the need to decide the
federal one. The latter group of cases is discussed at the end of this section
as the third rule whereby federal courts decline jurisdiction.
The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Legislative Appeals
The earliest rule evolved to distinguish cases in which state court
review is an essential part of the administrative process from those in which
it may be disregarded, differentiates between legislative and judicial review.
37. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, 138 F. Supp. 337, 341 (E.D. La. 1956).
Since most administrative bodies probably have no power to hold legislation uncon-
stitutional, Buder v. First Nat'l Bank, 16 F.2d 990 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 743
(1927), when the constitutionality of the basic statute is challenged there is little
justification for requiring the claimant to present his complaint to a body having
no power to decide the constitutional issue. See Stason, Timing of Judicial Redress
From Erroneous Administrative Action, 25 MINN. L. Rxv. 560, 576 (1941). Clear-
cut authorities accepting this argument primarily are in the lower courts. E.g.,
Panditz v. District of Columbia, 112 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Buder v. First Nat'l
Bank, 16 F.2d 990 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 743 (1927). Supreme Court
opinions would not seem to be conclusive. In Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S.
620 (1946), exhaustion was not required, but the Court's opinion was focused on the
adequacy of the state's remedy. In Goren v. State Tax Commn'n, 266 U.S. 265 (1924),
exhaustion was required. However, the Court may have assumed that the commission
could hold the tax invalid. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 633 (1951). See also
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (decision on the constitutional issue even
though state procedure to challenge the validity of the tax was not utilized).
38. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 204-05 (1924).
39. See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923).
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As noted before, the progenitor of this rule is Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R.4° A corporation brought suit in the federal court to enjoin
the enforcement of a rate order of the Virginia corporation commission.
The state remedy available to the claimant was an appeal of right from
the commission's order to the Virginia Supreme Court, which had the
power to make its own findings of fact and to revise the rates set by
the commission. Although the federal district court was held to have
jurisdiction to issue the injunction, the United States Supreme Court
held that, as a matter of equitable discretion, the claimant should be
forced to seek his remedy in the state court. Review by the state court
was held to be part of the state's legislative process, largely on the basis
of the court's power to substitute its own rate order for that of the com-
mission. The other side of the legislative-judicial distinction was estab-
lished by Bacon v. Rutland R.R. 41 As in Prentis, the issue was whether
a rate order should be enjoined by the federal court. Jurisdiction was as-
serted, since the review powers of the state court were limited to the
.. . correction of any errors excepted to in . . . [the board's]
proceedings, or in the form or substance of its orders, judgments and de-
crees on the facts found and reported by the said board.'" 42 The dis-
tinction between the two cases is important. In Prentis the state court
had the power to make its own independent findings of fact and substi-
tute its own order for that of the commission. In Bacon the commission's
findings of fact were final; the state court sat in review only as to orthodox
judicial matters.
The rule of the Prentis case has had few exceptions. Two of these
deserve mention here.4 When the regulatory statute itself is attacked
as unconstitutional, rather than the administrative action involving dis-
cretion under the statutory power, the claimant apparently may enter the
federal court without exhausting its state remedies. 44 Moreover, if the
disposition of the case was unreasonably delayed by the state court, con-
siderations of comity may no longer require exhaustion.
45
Comity aside, the Prentis rule has ample justification. When the
state court has revisory powers, the commission's order may be revised
so as to remove any federal question. In addition, the creation of a
court with revisory powers as part of the state's regulatory system would
tend to indicate that the state has provided for adequate protection of
any rights which the claimant may have. Moreover, if the appeal is con-
40. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
41. 232 U.S. 134 (1914).
42. Id. at 137.
43. An exception applicable to rate making proceedings arises when the state
court fails to enjoin the commission's order pending appeal. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 204-05 (1924) ; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261
U.S. 290 (1923).
44. Compare Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 211 U.S. 210 (1908), with
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
45. Cf. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
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sidered to be fully legislative, federal proceedings to hear the case will not
be barred by res judicata. Outside of peculiar circumstances, any federal
rights could be fully litigated in the federal district court after the highest
court of the state rendered its opinion.46 If the appeal is considered ju-
dicial and the claimant is forced to seek relief in the state court, the power
of the federal judiciary could be invoked only by means of a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.47
Notwithstanding its apparent merit, the legislative-judicial distinc-
tion as laid down in Prentis is not always easy to apply. It is relatively
simple to determine whether the reviewing court has power to revise
the agency order, but other tests of legislative conduct are not really
effective. For example, it is said that action in retrospect is judicial,
while action containing elements of futurity is legislative.48 Yet to an
extent, all judicial action affects future rights and all legislation determines
past rights. Another supposedly differentiating factor is that a legislature
acts with generality, while a court acts with particularity.4" Nevertheless,
the clearly legislative function of ratemaking may affect only a specific
person or class. It is sometimes said that the court is not acting legis-
latively if it has no initiatory powers, i.e., cannot institute action against
persons subject to the regulation.50 But few procedures, if any, in cases
where court review was considered legislative gave the state court initiatory
functions. Claimant was simply given an opportunity to review the order
by institution of suit. 1 Finally, the existence of discretion is asso-
ciated with a legislature, 52 but it is difficult to distinguish between legis-
lative and judicial discretion in many instances. These criteria involve
too much subjective judgment to serve as adequate standards for deter-
mining whether to refuse jurisdiction.
Abstention in Deference to State Administrative Agency-Finality of
Fact Finding
Even if the appeal is not considered legislative according to the Prentis
formulation, exhaustion of remedies in state courts may still be required.
Although the cases in this area involve total district court abstention and
46. This was expressly stated in the Prentis case. 211 U.S. at 230. The rationale
is that a legislative determination cannot be res judicata to any subsequent judicial
determination.
47. See note 13 supra.
48. See justice Holmes' formulation of the distinction in Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
49. See Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1946) (concurring
opinion).
50. In Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939), this is noted as a significant
factor.
51. See, e.g., Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461, 468 (1932) ; Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 211 U.S. 210, 224 (1908).
52. See Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1946) (concurring
opinion).
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are not strictly exhaustion cases, they should be considered in relation to
the Prentis doctrine.
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.53 arose over the regulatory scheme of oil
proration in Texas, under which permits to drill oil were granted by a
commission. Those aggrieved by any order of the commission could se-
cure judicial review in the court of Travis County, then by successive ap-
peals to the Court of Civil Appeals and to the Supreme Court of Texas.
Although the orders of the commission were tested for reasonableness by
a trial de novo in the state court, and the court could formulate and suggest
the adoption of new administrative standards for the commission, the com-
mission was charged with primary responsibility for fact-finding and policy
making. The Travis County court, unlike the Virginia appellate court
in the Prentis case, was generally limited to the administrative findings
of fact in the record. Although the Texas court could restrain the com-
mission from interfering with the leaseholder, it could not revise the terms
of the permit granted by the commission.
Without first exhausting these appeals, a suit based primarily on di-
versity of citizenship was brought in the federal court to restrain the com-
mission from granting a permit. The Supreme Court held that the suit
should be dismissed, noting that, "In describing the relation of the Texas
court to the Commission, no useful purpose will be served by attempting
to label the court's position as legislative . . . or judicial . . .- suffice
it to say that the Texas courts are working partners with the Railroad
Commission in the business of creating a regulatory system for the oil
industry." 5 An important factor in the decision was the thorough sys-
tem of state judicial review provided, in which all initial proceedings were
directed to one state court in order to avoid confusion and to develop a
court with specialized knowledge or expertise in administering the program.
There is greater reason for the federal court not to disrupt this system
when, as here, federal relief in the area would undoubtedly create delay,
misunderstandings of local law and conflicts with the state's policy. 5
Moreover, the state court's specialized knowledge would make it a more
adequate arbiter of conflicting rights.
The Burford rationale was extended in Alabama Pub. Serv. Cornm'n
v. Southern Ry.., 6 where the claimant sought a permit to discontinue cer-
tain local intrastate trains. On refusal by the state commission, suit was
brought in the federal district court. As in Burford, the state remedy was
by appeal to one designated county court. Moreover, the court's considera-
tion of all matters was limited to the commission's record. It could set aside
an order of the commission only if it was ". . . contrary to the substantial
weight of the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law. ."57 The
53. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
54. Id. at 325-26.
55. Id. at 327.
56. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
57. Id. at 348.
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Supreme Court noted that the problems involved depended upon pre-
dominantly local factors, and that the regulation of intrastate railroad serv-
ice is primarily of state concern. Since appeals concentrated in one county
court were "supervisory in character" according to state law,58 and the
procedure was not inadequate to preserve ultimate review of any federal
questions in the Supreme Court, considerations of comity were held to re-
quire exhaustion of the state remedies. In considering the objection that
the state court's review was limited to the commission's record, the Court
answered that this presented no constitutional infirmity and was adequate
review. Bacon v. Rutland R.R.55 " was explained as based on the theory
"... that the federal right of a utility to be protected from confiscation of
its property depended upon 'pure matters of fact' to the extent that a de
novo hearing of such facts in a federal court was essential to the protection
of constitutional rights." 19
Under the Prentis doctrine, federal deference was due to the broad
state court review labeled as legislative. The federal courts were re-
quired to abstain because the state courts could exercise greater discre-
tionary power than could the federal courts. On the other hand, in Burford
and Alabama the state courts involved had very narrow powers of review.
They could do much less to upset factual findings by the agency than could
the federal courts if the same suit were prosecuted by a bill in equity in
the federal forum. The Supreme Court had long been alarmed at the
disregard of state administrative fact-finding via suits in the federal district
courts. In such suits, the district courts being courts of original jurisdic-
tion, all issues must be tried de novo.60 The record of the state commis-
sion is evidence of the determination of the particular technical issue"
which is in effect dispository of the case, e.g., the rate base, the mode of
oil proration. In the parade of expert witnesses before federal judge and/or
jury unfamiliar with such technical matters, where varying witnesses pre-
sent different technical data and confront the court with perhaps five
or six alternative reasonable determinations, it was very likely that the
federal court would act on one that would not support the state administra-
tive order. 62 Unlike a state court legislative review which, when rejecting
58. Ibid. It should be noted that the extension of the Burford formulation of
judicial expertise solely because of concentration of agency review in one court deprives
the Burford formulation of any logical meaning and might leave the result of federal
jurisdiction solely in the hands of the drafters of state legislation.
58a. See text at note 41 supra.
59. 341 U.S. at 349 n.1l.
60. Bluefield Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 689 (1922); Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Whitcomb, 12 F.2d 279, 286 (1926) ; see Lilienthal, State Regula-
tion of Public Utilities, 43 H~av. L. REv. 379, 407 & n.131 (1930).
61. Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268 U.S. 413, 422 (1925); Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908) ; see Lilienthal, supra note 60, at 407 & n.132.
62. See Davis, Judicial Emasculation of Administrative Action and Oil Proration:
Another View, 19 TEXAs L. REv. 29 (1941) and authorities collected in Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 320-21 n.12 (1943).
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the agency determination, establishes a new one, a federal adjudication
in effect held that another technical determination was required, but left
final adjudication to the state administrative agency with no affirmative
determination. Even where the federally acceptable determination of the
technical issue could be ascertained, a state agency, after new proceedings
premised upon this determination, could find itself back in the federal
court with the new order now possibly being rejected by a different judge
and jury. An early reaction against such possibility was manifested in
the Supreme Court's reversal of a district court injunction against an order
entered under the same statute involved in the Burford case.6 In a suit
initiated under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court held that where expert testimony at the trial was conflicting,
the district court was bound to accept the testimony, if substantial, that
would support the constitutionality of the commission's order.
The Burford and Alabama cases may well have been a second reaction
depicting little confidence in the general judiciary in respect to the exercise
of broad control over semi-scientific matters. Here it was less likely that
administrative fact-finding would be upset in the state courts than in the
federal courts, because the state courts were limited to the facts in the
agency record. Thus, the federal deference in Burford and Alabama
may be considered as due to the limited powers of the state judiciary as
compared to those of the federal judiciary.
These cases present a formulation much more limited than that of
the Prentis doctrine. Prentis has been utilized without any regard to
the technicality of the subject matter of the agency proceeding. Although
definite doctrinal limitations cannot be drawn from only two cases,14 the
abstention rationale of Burford and Alabama seems to establish three fac-
tors for consideration: First, the technicality of the subject matter pri-
marily involved in the agency determination; "technical" is to be deter-
mined not by comparing the competency of the federal judiciary with the
state judiciary, but rather by comparing the competency of the judiciary
with the state commission. Secondly, whether the scope of review in the
state court is primarily limited to the facts found in the agency record.
Finally, and perhaps least important, whether appeals are concentrated in
one state court so that a degree of expertise may there be developed.
When the Prentis and Burford-Alabaz a doctrines are considered to-
gether, it seems that the major remaining area of concurrent federal-state
jurisdiction over appeals from state administrative agencies is comprised
of non-technical or scientific fields in which the state court's reviewing
powers are not so broad that they will be deemed an integral part of the
legislative or administrative process. Where technical scientific issues
63. Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
64. For general discussion of this area, see Coleman, The Effect of the Presence
of a State Law Question on the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 5 NAT'L B.J. 257
(1947); Comment, The Decline of Federal Concurrent Equity Jurisdiction, 40 CALIF.
L. REv. 300 (1952).
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underlie agency action, the federal courts are likely to abstain in favor of
state courts which have powers substantially greater or less than those of
the federal district court. A possible middle area of equivalent scopes
of review over technical matters need not be fully investigated here.
The cases most likely to be heard by a federal judge arise from agency
orders on non-technical subjects which are given orthodox judicial review
by the state courts. Here the weighing of the legislative-judicial distinction
can lead more easily to the conclusion that abstention is not desirable. This
has been particularly evident in cases arising under state statutes regulating
voter registration. Requirements for registration are relatively simple, in-
volving such matters as age, residency, payment of taxes and ability to read,
write or understand any part of the state or federal constitutions. Once
these facts are established, it is the officer's duty to register the applicant.
Thus far the cases arising under these statutes have all turned on whether
the appeal was judicial in nature. In Lane v. Wilson -" petitioner was
denied registration on the ground- that he had failed to register in 1916
during the twelve-day period provided.67 Suit was filed in the federal
district court attacking the constitutionality of the statute. The Supreme
Court denied that petitioner had to seek his remedy in the state court, 8
since the procedure had ". . all the indicia of a conventional judicial pro-
ceeding and does not confer upon the Oklahoma courts any of the discre-
tionary or initiatory functions that are characteristic of administrative
agencies." 69 Once the federal question was established, the Court did
not consider the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute in determining
the necessity of exhaustion.70 In Mitchell v. Wright 71 the same result was
reached even though the suit merely charged discrimination. It should be
noted that the state procedure provided in this case included a trial by jury,
which would definitely mark the proceeding as judicial. In Peay v. Cox,72
however, federal jurisdiction was denied where the claimant failed to appeal
first to the state board of election commissioners. The circuit court indicated
by way of dictum that state court review might also be necessary be-
fore the federal courts would intervene, despite the fact that the state
courts could review only as to errors of law. Considering the limited
scope of the court's review, and the fact that administration of voting
registration involves none of the wide discretionary powers or complicated
65. See Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924, 925 (5th Cir. 1946).
66. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
67. A twelve-day registration period was provided for voters other than those
who had been registered previously. Those who qualified to register then but did
not were forever barred from voting.
68. Claimant was given the right to initiate proceedings in a state court to receive
an "expeditious hearing" on his right to be registered. Lane v. Wilson, 98 F.2d 980,
981 (10th Cir. 1938).
69. 307 U.S. at 274.
70. Id. at 274-75; see note 45 mipra and accompanying text.
71. 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1946).
72. 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1951).
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problems present in the Burford and Alabama cases, the validity of the
dictum is questionable.
The Rules of Abstention and Relinquishment-
The Problem of Uncertain State Law
In many instances a controverted issue of state law may underlie the
federal claim at issue.73 In the ordinary case, the district court will decide
the state question first, in order to avoid unnecessary federal constitutional
decisions.74 However, sometimes the Supreme Court has required the
federal district courts to deny equitable relief against state officials, on the
ground that state courts are a more appropriate forum for the determination
of difficult and unresolved questions of state law. Since the state court de-
cision of the entire case would be open to federal attack only in the Supreme
Court,75 on occasion the district court may retain jurisdiction to adjudicate
any federal questions which may remain after resolution of the state
question in the state courts.76
In addition to the complexity of the state question, several factors are
important in predicting the disposition in any particular case. If the
federal claim is insubstantial, i.e., there is great doubt that the right on
which the plaintiff relies is federally protected, there is little reason for a
federal court to make a non-binding prediction of state law where state
remedies are more adequate to deal with the state issue. On the other
hand, when the validity of the federal claim is clear, assertion of federal
jurisdiction may be essential. Even though federal precedents clearly
establish the plaintiff's claim to a federally-protected right, federal juris-
diction may be necessary to insure impartial findings of facts necessary to
support the federal claim. 77  Also, federal interference with enforcement of
state laws may be justified in order to insure consistent development of fed-
eral law if the claim, though not clear, presents a substantial federal question.
If such a claim is unresolved by federal precedents, it may be more likely
73. When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the district court
usually must resolve all issues of state law. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228
(1943). But cf. Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933).
74. See Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). While a federal
court's decision on state law would probably be res judicata, it could not settle the
issue authoritatively. For this reason the Supreme Court has established the practice
of requiring that a decree resting on state grounds, where the Court's jurisdiction was
invoked on the basis of a federal question, include a provision permitting its reopening
in case the question of state law is later decided differently by a state court. See
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177
(1933); cf. Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 602 (1933).
75. See text at note 13 supra. The state court's action would undoubtedly be
judicial and therefore res judicata.
76. Since jurisdiction is continuous in the federal court, Spector Motor Serv., Inc.
v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 605 (1951), this procedural device prevents the state
court from deciding the federal issues. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 135
Conn. 37, 40-41, 61 A.2d 89, 92 (1948). If the state court should attempt to decide
the federal issue, it could probably be stayed under 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1952) since the
1948 amendment.
77. For an analysis of the importance of these considerations as applied to federal
question jurisdiction, see Mishkin, supra note 11, at 169-72.
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to receive impartial treatment in the federal courts. However, if it is
likely that resolution of the federal question may be avoided by a decision
based on state law, the complexity of both state and federal questions may
determine whether the state issue and, in some cases, the federal question
should be adjudicated in the state courts.
Total Abstention
On only a few occasions has the Supreme Court sent a case to the
state courts for adjudication without retaining jurisdiction to decide federal
questions. The principal factor on which the cases turn is the substan-
tiality of the federal question involved. In Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co.78 a federal district court temporarily enjoined enforcement of a
transit commission order denying relief from an allegedly confiscatory rate
regulation. The power of the commission to raise rates not found con-
fiscatory was uncertain under complicated state law. Since the court was
doubtful whether the claimant could prevail on the merits of his federal
claim, even if the state issue were to be resolved in his favor, the dismissal
was probably justified. The state court can authoritatively determine the
state issues involved; since the federal issue did not seem significant, there
was no reason to delay disposition of the case by reserving adjudication of
this issue in the federal courts.
As has been previously noted, the Burford and Alabamaz cases are also
ones of total abstention. In at least the Alabama case, it was potentially
possible to reach the same result by the formulation of the foregoing absten-
tion cases. Even if the allegations of the complaint were not so insub-
stantial as to require automatic dismissal, as the concurring justices be-
lieved, 79 the merits of the plaintiff's claim under both federal and state law
were so dubious that the suit might have been dismissed under the rule that
an injunction against state officials should not be granted where reasonable
doubt exists on the merits of the claim.
Relinquishment
The first case retaining jurisdiction to decide federal claims after state
courts resolve state issues was Railroad Comn'n v'. Pullman Ca.0 A Texas
statute gave the commission power to prevent " 'unjust . . . discrimination
. . . and all other abuses, in the conduct of railroad.' "81 The commission
ordered that "'no sleeping cars shall be operated on any line of railroad
in the state of Texas . . . unless such cars are continuously in charge of
an employee . . . having the rank and position of Pullman conductor.' " 82
78. 279 U.S. 159 (1929).
79. 341 U.S. at 351-52.
80. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). For other cases utilizing the Pullman technique, see
Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953) ; Shipman v. Du Pre, 339 U.S. 321 (1950) ;
AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaugfilin,
323 U.S. 101 (1944) ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
81. 312 U.S. at 499.
82. Id. at 497-98.
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Prior to this regulation it was common to have only a porter in charge of
sleeping cars when there were few such cars on the train, and the Pullman
Company's practice was to hire Negro porters and white conductors. The
Supreme Court held that the district court should not have enjoined en-
forcement of the regulation but should retain jurisdiction while the claimant
litigates in the state courts the issue of state law.
Although the district court enjoined enforcement of the order on the
basis of state law, the state issue was not free of doubt. If the use of porters
was due to a lower wage scale for Negroes, compelling use of conductors
might tend to change the company's discriminatory employment practices.
On the other hand, the order might force discrimination against employ-
ment of Negroes in sleeping cars. The federal right allegedly violated de-
pended on a determination of an unresolved constitutional question. The
regulation was not clearly unconstitutional, since any discriminatory effect
originated in the employment practices of the Pullman Company. In order
to avoid both of these difficult questions, it was reasonable to have the com-
mission's authority determined by the state courts, since this would be
authoritative and might obviate the need to decide the federal claim. How-
ever, since the constitutional question was substantial,, it was important
that the district court retain jurisdiction to decide the difficult federal ques-
tion if necessary, since it was likely to receive more impartial treatment in
the federal courts.
A nuinber of cases have utilized the Pullman technique.83 All involved
statutes which had not been interpreted in the state courts. Some of these
statutes represented important matters of state policy; 84 most of them,
as in Pullman, posed substantial federal questions unresolved by precedents.
Even if the facts were found as alleged, no clear constitutional claim ap-
peared. The primary reason for retaining jurisdiction was to insure
that a federal court decided important constitutional questions. How-
ever, retention of jurisdiction may also be utilized when factual
determinations are significant to resolution of the constitutional issues.
Consequently, where plaintiff has presented a substantial federal question,
it is desirable to retain federal jurisdiction to decide remaining constitu-
tional questions and also to resolve undetermined factual issues, as the
federal forum was that of plaintiff's original choice. This is illustrated by
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin,85 which involved a Connecticut
statute taxing foreign corporations doing business within the state. Al-
though the Supreme Court felt that the state court should determine
whether the statute applied to plaintiff, the fact that a substantial federal
question was posed led the Court to allow plaintiff a later determination of
this constitutional issue in the federal court. Similarly, because the volume
of the corporation's activities within the state is important in resolving
83. See note 80 supra.
84. E.g., Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953) (subversive activities);
AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946) (state right-to-work provision).
85. 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
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the constitutional issue,8 6 plaintiff was entitled to findings of fact in the
tribunal of his choice when and if the issue survived the state determination.
In such cases, even if the state court attempts to decide the federal question,
the district court has power through an exception in the anti-stay statute
to prevent the state tribunal from entering a judgment which might be
res judicata.
8 7
In the past, the use of the Pullman technique has been largely limited
to cases where uncertain state law is a basis for the federal question. Thus
far, the Supreme Court has utilized it only to resolve ambiguities raised by
state statutes which had not yet been construed by the highest court of the
state.88 However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has employed
this method to preserve its jurisdiction pending claimant's exhaustion of
administrative remedies.8 9  General use of this device in cases of federal
deference to state tribunals would clearly be an extension of existing
practice.
Assertion of Jurisdiction
In several cases the Supreme Court has ruled that jurisdiction of the
federal district court is proper, even though unresolved and uncertain state
issues are presented, if a relatively clear question of federal law necessarily
remains even after decision on state grounds. Such a situation arose in
Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co.9°
Under state law, the power of the commission to set rates was de-
pendent upon a finding that unreasonable rates had been charged in the
past. The federal issue was relatively free from doubt: whether Congress
pre-empted regulation of interstate gas companies by passage of the Natural
Gas Act. The Court relied upon a perhaps doubtful determination that
the state commission, whether it found the past rates unreasonable or not,
could enter a rate order only prospectively; thus, regardless of the decision
on the state issue of reasonableness, the federal question inevitably re-
mained whether a state agency could enter any order necessarily effective
after federal legislation completely occupied the field. District court juris-
diction was therefore upheld.
In addition to the fact that the federal question could not be avoided
regardless of the result under state law, an additional factor was perhaps
present in the clear validity of the gas company's federal claim. The
assertion of the rate-fixing power patently conflicted with the federal stat-
ute and, by earlier decisions, any state regulation would violate the com-
86. See Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoLum. L. Rzv. 1018, 1037-
40 (1925).
87. Federal courts may stay proceedings in state courts when necessary in aid
of their jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1952).
88. See note 80 supra.
89. See Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1951); Cook v. Davis, 178 F.2d
595 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950).
90. 317 U.S. 456, 463 (1943).
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merce clause.91 The assertion of jurisdiction in Thompson v. Consolidated
Gas Util. Corp.92 possibly rests primarily on the latter basis. There, after a
Texas gas proration statute had been declared unconstitutional by a federal
court,9 a Texas commission was created under an enabling statute suffi-
ciently broad that the commission promulgated regulations having the same
effect on gas owners as had the previously invalidated statute.9 4 Although
the new enabling statute was ill-defined and unconstrued, the Supreme
Court accepted a construction of the state statute authorizing the commis-
sion's regulation, and held the regulation unconstitutional.
The Thompson case was decided prior to Pullman but was not men-
tioned in the latter opinion.95 Since Pullman would seem to involve the
same operative facts, this may cast some doubt on the authority of Thomp-
son. However, two distinctions should be noticed. First, the Court may
have thought it unlikely in Thompson that the state court would hold the
commission without power to issue the regulation, in view of the statute's
legislative history. Secondly, and perhaps more important, the federal
question in Thompson was relatively free from doubt. 96 When the plain-
tiff's federal claim is clear, there seems little reason to avoid decision of the
federal question, since the only real issue is the validity of plaintiff's factual
allegations. In the Pullman case, on the other hand, regardless of the
facts, a decision on the federal question would be primarily a determination
of law, since it was questionable whether the order violated the constitution
or federal statute.
Several conclusions might be drawn from the foregoing. Where an
uncertain issue of state law underlies the plaintiff's claim to an injunction
against the state officials, the Supreme Court will direct abstention when-
ever the plaintiff's claim seems insubstantial on the merits. Jurisdiction
will be relinquished if the federal claim is substantial but would require the
recognition of a federal right not yet resolved by the Supreme Court.97
.91. See Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924); cf. Public
Util. Comm'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
92. 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
93. Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 59 F.2d 750 (W.D. Tex. 1932).
The invalidated statute was held to have the effect of compelling owners of existing
pipe lines to purchase gas from local owners who lacked pipe lines.
94. The enabling statute empowered the commission to prevent waste which was
statutorily defined to include "'. . . production of natural gas in excess of transporta-
tion or market facilities, or reasonable market demand . . . ."' 300 U.S. at 63.
The commission set a figure for all wells which resulted in limiting plaintiff's produc-
tion to an amount far below its contract requirements forcing it to buy sweet gas from
other producers. Id. at 66.
95. The case has never been overruled or cited by the Supreme Court since the
Pullman decision. However, it is not dead in the lower federal courts. See, e.g.,
Idaho Md. Mines Corp. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 576 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
96. The order "plainly . . . violated the federal constitution." 300 U.S. at 76.
97. Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 (1949) cannot be explained
on that rationale. In this case, an Hawaiian statute regulated the teaching of foreign
languages to children of various age groups. Under past precedents, claimant's bill
to enjoin the enforcement of the act presented at least a substantial federal ques-
tion. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the bill because the statute had not been
interpreted by the territorial courts. But unusual factors were present. First,
no criminal penalties were involved. More important, there was no need to retain
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The Court will assert jurisdiction over the entire case when some federal
question would necessarily remain, or when the determination of the federal
question is merely a determination on the facts of a known federal right.
Nevertheless, in any particular case intangible factors such as the Court's
estimate as to how the state court will resolve the issue are undoubtedly
influential.
SCHOOLS AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Thus far, the discussion has ranged widely from the specific problem
of federal jurisdiction over state school matters. As of this time, however,
no federal court has met the problem squarely. One circuit court has
indicated that the administrative procedure established by the North
Carolina statute, including provisions for review by state courts, must
be exhausted before the federal court can grant injunctive relief.98 One
district court has declared the Louisiana provision unconstitutional."9
The statute contained no standards for pupil assignment other than a
concurrently-enacted bill providing for segregation on the basis of race.'0 0
Since the statute was invalid on its face, doctrines of exhaustion were held
inapplicable. These decisions give little or no guidance, but a few con-
clusions may be drawn by analogy to the cases discussed heretofore.
Since the effect of anti-stay legislation as applied to the administrative
proceeding under these statutes has been considered previously, 10 1 discus-
sion here is not required. Assuming that a school board is not a court
within the meaning of this provision, the problem becomes primarily one of
the scope and effect of judicial rules and principles limiting the jurisdiction
of the federal district courts.
Administrative Bodies
Ordinarily, claimants will be forced to exhaust whatever remedies they
may have before the school boards, and if these bodies act promptly,
avoidance of this procedure will be difficult.' 02 It would probably be im-
possible to prove that utilization of this relief is futile.'03 The only feasible
jurisdiction to protect federal rights as in the other Pullman type cases because of the
nature of the territorial courts. E.g., all judges of the territorial courts of Hawaii
are appointed by the President of the United States for four year terms, 31 STAT. 156
(1900), as amended, 48 U.S.C. § 633 (1952) ; all civil cases where the value in con-
troversy exceeds $5,000 are appealable from the final decision of the Hawaiian
Supreme Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit independ-
ent of federal questions, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1293, 1294(5) (1952).
98. Hood v. Board of Trustees, 232 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1956), petition for cert.
filed, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3052 (U.S. July 12, 1956) (No. 248); see Carson v. Board of
Education, 227 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1955).
99. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. La. 1956).
100. LA. REV. STAT. § 17:331 (Supp. 1955).
101. See text at pp. 977-79 supra.
102. See text at pp. 979-80 supra.
103. See e.g., Hampton v. Thompson, 171 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1948) (Negroes
required to exhaust before NRAB although they alleged it was fatally tainted with
race discrimination); Ritzholz v. Ammon, 240 Wis. 578, 592, 4 N.W.2d 173, 179
(1942) (bias, prejudice or corruption of state administrative body will not dispense
with exhaustion requirement where there is subsequent court review). See DAvis,
ADmINIsTRATivE LAW 627-28 (1951) (authorities collected).
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way to avoid delay in obtaining judicial review is to attack the statute as
patently unconstitutional without waiting for the school board to apply it
to petitioner. The type of statute under consideration, however, seems
ostensibly valid. Nevertheless, despite the lack of vitiating language, the
statute might be held unconstitutional on its face. Such a result was
reached in Davis v. Schnell.01 4 A federal district court enjoined enforce-
ment of an Alabama constitutional provision that electors must be able to
"understand and explain" any article of the federal constitution. A board
of election registrars in a county with 36 per cent colored population had
registered only 104 Negroes while registering 2,800 white persons under
this provision. The district court held the provision to violate the fifteenth
amendment because it was so vague as to leave arbitrary power in the
board.' 0 5
Even if plaintiff attacks an unconstrued state statute on its face, the
federal court might employ the Pullman technique to enable the state ad-
ministrative board or court to consider the statute first. However, the
Davis case provides an argument for avoiding this. Considering the prob-
lem of holding an unconstrued statutory provision unconstitutional due to
insufficient standards of delegation, the court pointed out that if the exact
meaning of the phrase "understand and explain" were discovered by a
process of construction, it might be that a suitable and definite standard
could be found to validate the amendment. However, the court noted the
legislative history of the act and found that the generality and ambiguity
were intentionally incorporated to accomplish the discriminatory result. 106
The Supreme Court affirmed in a memorandum opinion,10 7 citing a case
that upheld an almost identical Mississippi constitutional provision 108
where discriminatory enforcement had not been satisfactorily shown.'10 9
104. 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
105. The Davis case would seem to be unique in that the statute was unconstrued
and no criminal sanctions were imposed by the statute. It has long been established
that any state separation or delegation of powers does not in itself present a federal
constitutional question. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902). This principle
has been reaffirmed frequently. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 291
U.S. 300, 303-04 (1934) ; O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 545-46 (1933)
(dictum) ; Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428, 443 (1923) (dictum). There-
fore, to violate the Federal Constitution a statutory delegation of power must b. so
vague as to violate procedural due process or a federal right. This criterion is
stringent. It was met in Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931);
cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). For collected cases
withstanding an attack on vagueness on both criminal and civil statutes, see Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) ; DOWLING, CoxsmrruoNA. LAw 752-53
(4th ed. 1950). In the cases which have invalidated state statutes, the statutes had
been previously interpreted by the state court and had imposed criminal sanctions.
106. 81 F. Supp. at 879-80.
107. Davis v. Schnell, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
108. The Court's citation was: "Cf. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213." The
provision under attack there made the ability "'... to read any section of the con-
stitution . . . or . . . understand the same when read . . ."' a prerequisite to
registration. Id. at 218 n.1. The result of the Davis case has had little effect on
Alabama sufferage law. See 4 ALA. L. REv. 317 (1952).
109. Proof of discriminatory administration of the law is not made easily. There
must be ". . . an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may
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Even so, challenge of school legislation on such grounds would not com-
pletely solve the problem. Presumably, these statutes could be drafted to
withstand attack for vagueness, and without clearly incriminating legis-
lative history.
Exhaustion of State Court Review
It is at least doubtful whether, under existing precedents, the federal
courts would be required to consider state court review of school authori-
ties' decisions as a part of the administrative process which must be ex-
hausted. Some of the statutes make trial by jury the, initial step in the
state court's review.'10 Such a procedure could hardly be considered
"legislative" under the Prentis doctrine. Furthermore, it is extraordinarily
difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of revisory powers being involved
where the only issue before the state court is whether a particular child
did or did not meet existing student criteria. On the other hand, if
only the school board's regulation were attacked, but not its application or
the enabling statute, a court empowered to revise the regulations might be
considered as acting in a legislative capacity. In that case, not only would
exhaustion of the state appeal be necessary under Prentis but access to the
federal district court would be impossible, since such an attack on the
regulation apart from its application would lack the elements of case or
controversy necessary for federal jurisdiction."'
Other statutes provide for judicial review only on the facts found in
the record of the school board." 2  Thus, one element of the Burford-
Alabama formulation is present."13 Under these statutes, however, appeals
are not concentrated in a single court in order to supervise the program
on a state-wide basis. Such a concentration would be unique since admini-
stration of school systems, unlike utility regulation, has been primarily a
matter of local concern. The greatest difficulty in invoking the Burford-
Alabama doctrine to limit a federal district court's jurisdiction is the re-
quirement of technical subject-matter necessitating semi-scientific knowl-
edge. Where a state commission is selecting a rate basis for a particular
appear on the fact of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person
• . . or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design
to favor one individual or class over another not to be inferred from the action itself.
* . ." Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). Prima facie cases of a denial of
equal protection have been made when no member of the class alleging discrimination
has received the benefit sought over a long period of time or when there have been
disproportionate extensions of benefits to other groups. See cases collected in
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-80 (1954).
110. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 6334-05 (Supp. 1954).
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
112. None of the statutes under consideration specifically provide for such a
limited review. The Florida statute provides school board decision on student qualifi-
cation for admittance shall be final and does not provide for any court review. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 230.23 (6) (g) (Supp. 1955). The Alabama statute provides for review
only when a claim is presented under the United States Constitution. Acts of Ala.
1955, No. 201, § 4, at 493.
113. See text at p. 985 supra.
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utility, the determination will involve a selection of one of several reason-
able alternativ&; laymen in such highly technical matters cannot be ex-
pec.ted to understand the 'interplay of complex" factors determining the
resilt. Furthermore, a federal suit challenging a commission's order in
effect involves the validity of the administrative standard, and not merely
its application. On the other hand, application of "student criteria to any
particular child should not, if the statute is what it purports to be and
provides definite legislative standards, involve much discretion. Federal
judges are probably as cajable as the school board members, who may
devote only a few hours a week to school affairs, in determining whether
a given student meets objectiv e standard for school admitfance. Possible
rejection in federal court of the school board's finding of fact would not
upset the legislative cheme or impair the validity of any school board rule
or regulation, if sucli regulation Were not itself the forbidden discrimination.
.As the federal court would not be invalidating any regulation, but only
sustaining the school board's finding of fact that the particular child does
not qualify for admission under general regulations, or compelling admis-
sion of the child after reversing such finding, no'subsequent agency deter-
mination on the matter is necessary. Indeed, an attempt by the school
board to redetermine the identical question may place it in contempt of
court. It follows that application of the'Burford-Alabama doctrine s6 as to
deny federal jurisdiction in this area would ignore the premise on which
the doctrine was founded. Where the state court is limited to the facts
found by the school board in such matters as student qualification, it is
even more essential for the protection of federal rights that some judicial
tribunal exists that can try the facts de novo.
Relinquishment
It is equally doubtful that the federal district courts are bound to
relinquish jurisdiction because the statute is unconstrued. Davis v. Schnell
presented one method 'of avoiding this result, basing a holding of uncon-
stitutionality on the deliberate vagueness of the statute. However, this
may not be the only ground on which remission to the state courts may be
avoided. The claimant's federal right to equal treatment is clearly estab-
lished by Brown v. Board of Education."4  Thus, unlike the Pullman
case, which involved determination whether the claimants possessed a
federal right, all that remains here are pure matters of fact as to violation
of the known federal right.115 .There seems little reason to avoid such
decision by remitting the case to the state courts for clarification of state
law.
A recent circuit court decision, Romero v. Weakley," 6 gives some sup-
port to this analysis. There it was alleged that claimants had been given
114. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
115. For an analysis of the importance of the federal district court's decision of
these issues, see Mishkin, supra note 11, at 170-76.
116. 226.F.2d 399 (9th Cir.), reversing 131 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
996 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
segregated school assignments solely on the basis of race. The district
court had refused to exercise jurisdiction, largely on the basis of Pullmn
and Alabama. In reversing, the circuit court noted that the constitutional
issue was purely one of fact, although Pullman and Alabama were distin-
guished on other grounds.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it appears that the federal district courts could
accept jurisdiction once relief has been sought before the state administra-
tive body. Whether the courts will accept jurisdiction, however, is a
problem which cannot be resolved here.1 17 The May 31st decrees I' were
formulated in terms which throw little light on the present problem. The
Supreme Court stated: "School authorities have the primary responsibility
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these [varied local school] problems;
courts will have to consider whether the action of the school authorities
constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles." 119 Since one of the cases was remanded to the Delaware
Supreme Court,1 2 0 it is clear that the Court was referring to state as well
as federal courts.12 ' It is certainly arguable that the state statutes here con-
sidered are simply attempts to implement the Court's decree by integrating
schools along a rational pattern, and that therefore the district courts should
not interfere. 2 " The fact that the Delaware case was remanded to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court " . for such further proceedings as that Court
may deem necessary in light of this opinion" 122 may add some weight to
this argument, although as far as only legal factors are involved, hearings in
the federal district courts would not impair the validity of such legislative
schemes but merely test the fairness of those who apply the statutory
standards.
It is axiomatic that such problems as school segregation cannot be
resolved solely by legal doctrines. Social and political factors are now of
prime pragmatic importance in the implementation of the Brown decision.
Community mores alone in many areas will prevent filing of suits in the
federal district courts. Federal judges in many areas will be loath to dis-
turb school board decisions for some time yet,123 despite the fact that they
are not locally elected. Similarly, federal juries, if used, will be unlikely
to override strongly-held community opinions.
117. For comity considerations in conjunction with school law, see PAUL, LAW
AND GOVERNMENT, THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION DECISioN 70-74, 88-94, 105-07 (1954).
118. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
119. Id. at 299. (Emphasis added.)
120. Id. at 301.
121. Compare the statement in Hoxie School Dist v. Brewer, 137 F.2d 364
(E.D. Ark. 1956), that the district court had jurisdiction since in practical effect the
decrees retained federal jurisdiction not only in the cases before the Supreme Court
but in all similar cases.
121a. See the dissenting opinion in Brown v. Rippy, 233 F.2d 796, 797 (5th Cir.
1956).
122. 349 U.S. at 301.
123. Traces of such hesitancy appear in recent decisions. E.g., Bell v. Rippy,
133 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Tex. 1955, rev'd sub norn. Brown v. Rippy, 233 F.2d 796
(5th Cir. 1956).
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Initially, as already indicated by the decree in the first of the school
cases, the Supreme Court has decided not to by-pass the state judicial
system. Whether the Supreme Court will continue to rely upon the state
courts to implement the segregration decrees may well depend upon the
Court's determination of the adequacy of the effort to abolish segregation,
and its own ability to correct abuses by certiorari to a state court for review
on that court's record of action taken there. If the Court finds that state
courts are attempting to nullify the desegregation decree, the efficacy of re-
view by certiorari will be small. Then the need for an impartial fact
finding tribunal, and the lack of a difficult federal question, may engender
increased use of federal district courts to end segregation in public school
systems.
